The spread of competition laws in Latin America has been accompanied, as in Central and Eastern Europe, by warnings against over-enforcement, and in particular against enforcement of provisions against the "abuse of a dominant position" in a market that may discourage legitimate, procompetitive actions and strategies. We examine all instances of competition agency findings of abuse of dominance for eight Latin American countries over the period [2001][2002][2003]. We find a) that there have been relatively few such rulings in most countries, b) that roughly half of such rulings have been in traditionally "regulated industries", which suggests that the number of rulings may fall as sectoral regulatory agencies gain more capability and experience, c) that many rulings have arguably targeted government-imposed restrictions on competition as well as privately imposed restrictions, and d) that a majority of rulings have attacked exclusionary rather than exploitative abuses.
The widespread adoption of competition laws in the 1990s was accompanied by controversy, especially in the US, regarding the importance and even the appropriateness of introducing such legislation early in the transition to a market economy.
1 Critics feared that active competition law enforcement would introduce too many false positive regulatory actions, becoming yet another avenue for inefficient government intervention and naïve enforcement of the law that might retard economic development by restricting productive business arrangements and otherwise reducing incentives for investment.
2 For many of these critics, one way to limit the anticipated negative effects of a competition law would be to introduce "a competition policy system that emphasized advocacy and enforced prohibitions on naked trade restraints. [Critics] would not establish competition laws that prohibit the full range of behavior -abuse of a dominant position, mergers, vertical restraints, and price discrimination -commonly subject to antitrust oversight in older Western competition systems." 3 No other part of a comprehensive competition law was as subject to criticism as the prohibition against abuse of dominance. It was feared that abuse provisions were particularly likely to be overenforced, thereby chilling growth-enhancing business conduct and causing considerable harm to consumers. These critics argued that the abuse of dominance provisions of new competition laws in developing countries could act as "a Trojan Horse for the smuggling in of price controls and other dubious government harassment of successful enterprises."
4 By limiting freedom of contract, enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions would inhibit the market economy that liberalization seeks to foster.
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Even proponents of the adoption of comprehensive competition laws expressed concerns about abuse of dominance provisions. 6 They questioned whether in enforcing abuse provisions new agencies would focus on "questionable" anticompetitive practices, i.e. excessive pricing, price discrimination, or other "exploitative" practices, as opposed to bringing actions against exclusionary practices that are generally considered more likely to be harmful to competition. 7 This paper explores whether fears of over-enforcement of dominance provisions have been borne out in the experience of Latin America, and examines both the types of conduct ("exploitative" or exclusionary) that have been sanctioned and the particular sectors of economies where abuse enforcement has been focused. Abuse of dominance, as used in this paper, includes, inter alia, excessive pricing, price discrimination, predatory pricing, refusals to deal/sell, exclusive contracts, tied selling or bundling, and raising rivals' costs. The principal analytical approach employed in this paper is a comparison of abuse of dominance legal provisions and enforcement actions across eight jurisdictions, using a similar methodology to that of AODCEE.
Latin America provides an interesting case study because although the trend may now be reversing, over the past twenty years it has been a region of neoliberal, pro-market, Washington consensus reforms, and the question of whether governments that have given lip service to free markets have 5 Rodriguez and Coate offer a detailed explanation of how prohibitions against a variety of abuse of dominance conducts, including exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, price discrimination and tying, could be harmful. "Exclusive dealing agreements may reduce the profitability of opportunism by linking more tightly the prospects of the two businesses…. By precluding downstream firms from signing exclusive contracts, regulators may make various business relationships untenable. …the antitrust regulators could attack the upstream firms for refusal to deal with various other downstream firms…. Such an antitrust policy creates a number of problems for a market economy….
[a]n active refusalto-deal policy could degenerate into price setting by the government regulators….Naive enforcement of antitrust regulations against price discrimination may preclude [certain] sophisticated contract [s] by mandating a single price for each type of business relationship. Although manufacturers could claim an efficiency justification for its pricing behavior, the firm is likely to have problems proving its policy is efficient, because enforcers usually take a narrow view of efficiencies… Thus, efficient contracting solutions are lost under active antitrust enforcement. …tying schemes often offer customers a low price for the purchase of a product in exchange for a commitment to buy related products from the firm at higher prices. … this type of tying is generally considered to be a price discrimination scheme…. Tying is often considered illegal per se, so no efficiency defense could be mounted. If enforcement activity prevents the partners from using tying, other less efficient contractual terms would have to be devised to make the contract self-enforcing. In some situations, no terms may exist, so the contract would not be viable." Rodriguez and Coate (1996) , supra note 1 at 354-357. also refrained from large-scale economic intervention is a real one. 8 Latin America also provides a rich set of experience for examination because of its diversity -seen in the dominance provisions themselves, the institutional structure of the competition agency, and the wide range of the economic importance of each country.
9 For example, some jurisdictions prohibit practices such as excessive pricing while others do not. With respect to institutional structure and caseloads, Latin America offers a variety of experiences. Panama and Peru, for example, generally initiate fewer than 15 cases per year, while Mexico handles upwards of 200 cases each year. Similarly, in 2003, Costa Rica's agency had fewer than 20 professionals, and operated on a budget of approximately US$200,000; in the same year the Mexican agency had 120 professionals dedicated to competition, and had a budget of approximately US$15 million.
I. Have fears of over-enforcement of dominance provisions been borne out?
Commentators concerned about over-enforcement of the antitrust laws in Latin America have been concerned principally about the unilateral intervention of the antitrust agency in markets, in the context of broader governmental tendencies and temptations to intervene in market processes.
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This fear is related at least in part to the particular historical relationship between business and government in Latin America, where the private sector developed not in partnership with governments (as, for example, in Asia) but rather with the "favors" of government.
11 As far back as colonial times, when a relationship with the Spanish crown was essential for succeeding as entrepreneur, government intervention has played a paramount role in shaping the economic institutions of the region. Government has dictated how the entrepreneurs must behave, what to produce, and so forth.
12 It is not surprising that the initial opponents to the adoption of competition laws in Latin America were the business communities. 13 The business communities feared that in negotiating business deals, the competition law would become an additional bargaining tool for the government, rather than being used as it should, to attack government and private restrictions on competition.
Only five or ten years ago companies reached cartel agreements supervised by the government, while now governments seek to prohibit such agreements.
14 Ironically, the very fact that the forms and appearances are not much changed while the philosophy has changed -in the direction of liberalization and the support of markets -may make competition law enforcement and regulation more difficult in Latin America than in Central and Eastern Europe, where it is more obvious that nothing is as it was. is so closed that citizens learn of new policies when they are formally announced or decreed by the political leadership. In general, policy making is dominated by high level administrators and politicians."
13 This contrasts with Asia, where governments promoted the adoption of competition laws after the collapse of the corporate sector in order to break away from cronyism.
14 While historically in both Asia and Latin America cartels and collective market arrangements were promoted by governments, in Asia the government sanctioned the arrangement and then actively participated in it, nurturing the conglomerates to ensure their strength. In Latin America, by contrast, government tended to sanction the arrangement in a less transparent fashion, and never monitored the results. 52, 53, 54, 70, 71, 72, 94, 95, and 96. It is clear that abuse of dominance investigations do not generally account for a large share of agency caseload. 17 For example, abuse of dominance investigations accounted for less than two percent of all investigations in Brazil and Colombia, and approximately eight percent of all investigations in Mexico. As a proportion of all conduct investigations, dominance cases were low for some jurisdictions (e.g., seven percent for Colombia), higher in others (e.g., 38 percent in Brazil, 45 percent in Mexico).
If attention is shifted from the number of investigations to actual enforcement actions against the alleged anticompetitive conduct by the dominant firm, it becomes clear that the number of such actions is generally low in absolute terms. Table 2 presents findings of abuse in each country, by year. The number of abuse findings is minimal, and even these may reflect more the competition agencies' need to act as sectoral regulators in the absence of strong independent regulatory institutions than any tendency to intervene indiscriminately in the everyday business decisions of private firms.
A decade ago, Janusz Ordover, Paul Clyde, and Pittman (Ordover and Pittman 1993; Ordover, et al. 1994 ) noted that many Central and Eastern European countries were setting up competition agencies but were not yet setting up agencies for regulating the behavior of the "natural monopoly" enterprises in sectors like energy, telecommunications, and transport. (perhaps temporary) absence of such regulatory agencies, the competition authorities were the only government bodies able to protect the citizenry from monopoly abuses, and that these authorities should act as "quasi-regulators" of these "natural monopoly" enterprises, using as their regulatory weapon the abuse-of-dominance provisions of the competition laws, until regulatory agencies were created to take their place. Table 3 shows the industries that were designated as "regulated" or "borderline regulated" by Pittman (2004) when he examined this hypothesis for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for 1996 and 2001. He found that indeed a large percentage of abuse findings had been in these regulated sectors, where one would expect much of the enforcement energies to be devoted by traditional regulatory agencies rather than the antitrust agencies of more general jurisdiction. Table 4 suggests that the same pattern found for the Central and Eastern European countries has held true for Latin America in the early years of the 21 st century as well. Despite the fact that in general the Latin American countries have moved further than the Central and Eastern European countries in setting up independent regulatory agencies, 18 it is clear that the antitrust agencies retain a good deal of responsibility for protecting customers from abusive behavior by these traditional "natural monopolies": between one quarter and one half of the abuse findings may be characterized in this way, depending on the definition of "regulated sectors" used. 20 Independent companies offering telephone system maintenance contracts claimed that they would be unable to compete effectively in the MD 110 market without access to replacement parts. In a 2003 decision, CADE found that Matec had unlawfully foreclosed competition in the market for system maintenance services, because competing companies could not operate without access to replacement parts. The foreclosure reduced consumer welfare because the affected telephone system purchasers were "locked-in" to the MD 110 phone system by high switching costs. Competition at the point of sale for telephone systems was not adequate to forestall a market failure in the case of the federal government -which was a prime MD 110 customer -because government procurement rules disabled the government from selecting any bid but the lowest, without regard for post-purchase servicing costs.
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In Mexico, the CFC has brought a series of dominance cases against Telmex, the dominant telephone services provider. One example in 2000 involved a proceeding in which the CFC found an unlawful refusal to deal. Consumers calling 800 "toll free" numbers operated by long distance companies had to purchase a Telmex pre-paid "Ladatel" card if they wished to make the call using a Telmex public phone. Customers using public phones to call 800 numbers operated by Telmex were not subject to this expense, and Telmex refused to contract with competing operators so that they could absorb directly the cost of public phone access. The competitors, of course, could not effectively market 800 number services to companies because companies did not want callers to pay for public phone access when making a "toll free" call. As a result of the case, callers no longer have to pay for public phone access when the 800 number is operated by a long distance provider with whom Telmex has signed an agreement. 21 If, however, Telmex does not have a signed agreement with the long distance carrier that operates an 800 number, Telmex charges $1.00 per minute.
As with the CEE countries, one may predict that in Latin America the antitrust agencies will have fewer enforcement responsibilities in the traditionally regulated sectors of the economy -hence more resources to devote to enforcement in the traditionally unregulated sectors -once the regulatory agencies become more effective.
An equally important observation is that, at least in some countries, the competition authorities appear to be challenging some forms of government intervention in markets. For example, three of the five findings of abuse in Colombia appear to be related to government restrictions on competition. More than 20 of the 33 Mexican cases appear to involve government restrictions, with cases against Telmex, concessions in transportation, Pemex, syndicated unions, and so on. Many of the findings of abuse in non-regulated sectors likewise appear to involve other types of government restrictions. While a more detailed analysis would be necessary, it seems likely that many of the government restrictions being attacked are restrictions put in place at the request of powerful business interests with the aim of restricting competition. 22 Under those circumstances, attacking government restrictions would be an especially procompetitive use of a competition agency's scarce resources.
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II. Design and Enforcement of Dominance Provisions
Analysts have distinguished between two types of monopolistic practices prohibited by abuse-ofdominance provisions in competition laws. First, there can be prohibitions against certain practices in which the dominant firm uses its monopoly power to exploit other market participants without directly affecting the structure of the market, by, inter alia, charging high prices to customers, discriminating among customers, and paying low prices to suppliers. This conduct is sometimes referred to as "exploitative" conduct. Second, there are prohibitions against conduct that is aimed directly at the preserving or exacerbating anticompetitive aspects of the structure of the market: 21 For example, during the CFC investigation, Telmex had agreements with ATT, MCI, and Sprint and others. Today, with those carriers the service is toll free for the callers. Telmex does not have agreements with many national long distance providers. 22 Robert Bork and others have argued that "[m]isuse of courts and government agencies is a particularly effective means of delaying or stifling competition." Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, at 159 (1978, rev. 1993) . Competitors may rely on government restrictions for a variety of reasons. "Abuse of government processes presents a very different tradeoff of risks and benefits than aggressive price cutting for several reasons. First, unlike predatory pricing, it frequently is likely to succeed, because the exclusionary effect often operates by force of law. Second, by comparison with predatory pricing, it may cost little to attempt. Finally, and most fundamentally, the conduct does not in any way resemble 'competition on the merits.' False statements to government agencies are not susceptible to any justification. They cannot be explained in terms of the defendant's effort to increase output or improve product quality, innovation or service. …Some staff members of the FTC have described abuse of government processes as an example of 'cheap exclusion' -exclusionary conduct that is "cheap" both in the sense that it is inexpensive to attempt, and that it has little positive value to consumers because it lacks any cognizable efficiencies." See Roundtable on Competition on the Merits, Note by the United States, OECD (May 2005) , at 4, 7; citing Creighton, Hoffman, Krattenmaker and Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72 Antitrust L. J. 975 (2005) . 23 The Federal Trade Commission in the U.S., for example, has brought several cases in recent years that involve the alleged abuse of governmental processes to obtain market power shielded by law. See at Roundtable on Competition on the Merits, Note by the United States, OECD (May 2005), at 4, 7. conduct that creates or maintains the monopolist's power, in which the firm tries to suppress competition by, for example, refusing to deal with a competitor, through predatory pricing, or by raising rivals' costs. Since such conduct seeks to exclude competitors and competition from the market, it is often referred to as "exclusionary" conduct.
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For many scholars, the difficulty in determining what is an acceptable exercise of market power, necessary for a determination of whether an exploitative abuse has occurred, suggests that competition agencies should "seek to minimize the extent to which they regulate prices of individual firms and focus more on seeking to prevent firms from engaging in exclusionary acts that threaten competition." 25 Others argue that dominance provisions should prohibit only exclusionary conduct, not exploitative conduct. With respect to Latin America, Coate and others urged the countries adopting laws to focus on exclusionary practices. 26 In the U.S., violations of §2 of the Sherman Act generally apply only to exclusionary conduct. 27 Exploitative acts, such as charging monopolistic prices, are not attacked by enforcers because, inter alia, this type of enforcement is considered impractical and, it is feared, may discourage firms from competing as vigorously as they otherwise would. 28 Proponents of this view frown on prohibitions of excessive pricing, for example (prohibitions included in the competition laws of Brazil and some other countries), which is a purely exploitative act. Laws which prohibit practices that might be called exclusionary, such as price discrimination, but in fact are exploitative, 29 may also be deemed problematic according to 24 The Supreme Court described exclusionary conduct as conduct that contributes to the acquisition or maintenance of market power by means other than competition on the merits. , supra note 6. They suggest, "an active predation policy must carefully focus only on exclusionary tactics of would-be monopolists, rather than on interactions associated with robust competition…Antitrust policy should screen cases to eliminate those where predation cannot explain the market behavior…." at 67; "an optimal antitrust policy that considers enforcement costs and chilling effects would not focus its enforcement on vertical restraints" at 77; "Given the lack of experience with market economies, Latin American regulations should narrowly define price discrimination policies." at 79. Instead they encourage, "Initially, Latin American governments could define a set of exclusionary practices…." at 80.
27 Unlawful monopolization requires, inter alia, proof of exclusionary conduct: "[i]n order to satisfy any conduct component of the monopolizing offense, the conduct in question must be capable of making a significant contribution to the creation, maintenance, or expansion of monopoly power." Areeda and Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law (2 nd ed.), 650a.
28 Areeda and Hovenkampf explain, "Many hesitate to condemn mere monopoly as such for the following reasons:
a. Condemnation of all market power is impractical because varying degrees of power are pervasive in the economy.
b. Condemnation of mere monopoly is unfair because the characterization of market power as monopoly is inevitably arbitrary, because bad conduct cannot be presumed, and because even equitable relief deprives the innocent monopolist of 'just' rewards.
c. Some monopolies are economically inevitable or governmentally licensed. … d. Condemnation of the monopolist that achieved its position solely by fair and vigorous competition could discourage others from vigorous competition that antitrust law seeks to encourage." Id. at 630b.
this thinking. (Furthermore, while discrimination may appear "unfair", its implications for economic welfare are generally ambiguous. Possible welfare benefits of discrimination include the supply of customers who would not pay a nondiscriminatory higher price and improving the ability of sellers to recover high levels of fixed costs.) Certainly, jurisdictions are encouraged by both commentators and fellow enforcers to bring exclusionary conduct cases as opposed to exploitative conduct cases. 30 Regardless of whether critics argue that exploitative behavior should not be prohibited at all or in part, many agree that enforcement actions against this type of behavior should be limited.
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In keeping with the European civil law tradition of spelling out in detail what is prohibited, 32 most of the Latin American competition laws have enacted dominance provisions that list a series of behaviors by a dominant firm or firms that are prohibited, and despite the widespread skepticism regarding various "exploitative" practices, most prohibit, inter alia, price discrimination or the imposition of discriminatory conditions, and about half prohibit excessively high prices. All have restrictions on tying, which may arguably be used for either exploitation (as a pricing strategy) or exclusion (making competitive entry more difficult.)
33 Table 5 presents the types of conduct that are most frequently specifically prohibited in the legal provisions of Latin American competition laws.
(including most tie-in agreements), are monopolistic but not exclusionary….They enable the monopolist to extract higher profits without preventing equally or more efficient new entrants from challenging his monopoly." Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust Law", 2 nd ed., at 41-42. More specifically, the majority of enforcement cases (60%) during 2001-2003 focused on clearly exclusionary types of abuses. Within the exclusionary cases, the greater part of the cases involved refusals to deal (34% of exclusionary cases, or 21% of total abuse findings) and exclusive dealing (26% of exclusionary cases, 16% of total cases.) In Mexico, for example, 16 of the total abuse of dominance findings involved telecommunications, and of those, seven were refusals to deal, and two were exclusive dealing. In our sample there were only two findings of predatory pricing, or 3% of total abuse findings during that period. One of the predatory pricing cases involved telecommunications (Colombia), and the other the food industry (Mexico). While a closer examination of the cases, which is outside the scope of this chapter, is necessary for concluding definitively that these Latin American agencies are not seeking to regulate the prices or discriminatory acts of individual firms, it does appear that they are focusing more on exclusionary acts.
Conclusion
Enforcement actions against abuse of a dominant position appear to be of relatively low frequency in Latin America, and in many cases the competition agency appears to be compensating for ineffective institutions in regulated industries. 34 Importantly, in many cases the competition agencies appear to be attacking government restrictions, far from using the "government process to attack successful business." 35 In Latin America, government restrictions remain a core component of restrictions on market competition, and it is a positive development if the competition agencies are seeking to dismantle them. Finally, the majority of enforcement actions involve "exclusionary"
